The motivational pull of video game feedback, rules, and social interaction: Another self-determination theory approach

This paper argues that most video game enjoyment can be understood in terms of the type of feedback used, the rules set out by the game and the social elements of the game - concepts that have been identified as critical to video games. Self-determination theory (SDT) is used as a lens for understanding the mechanism by which these traits might lead to enjoyment. Specifically, the argument is that feedback, rules, and social elements of games will fulfill the dimensions of SDT - competence autonomy, and relatedness. Then, the dimensions of SDT will predict enjoyment. Participants were presented with a game that emphasized feedback, rules, or social elements. Games that emphasized flexible rules led to feelings of competence while games that emphasized social elements led to feelings of relatedness. Competence and elatedness then led to feelings of enjoyment. In doing so, this study identifies key elements of video games while illuminating ways to understand video game enjoyment

Old Games, Same Concerns: Examining First Generation Video Games Through Popular Press Coverage from 1972-1985

This study explores early video game technology by examining video game fears in the popular press in the 1970s and 1980s. This textual analysis examines games during their formative years, assesses risks associated with new technology, and encourages critical examination of technophobia in news media. This topic is particularly relevant in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision regarding video game regulation. Key findings include: physical ailment fears, deviant behavior fears, fears related to drug use, and violent behavior fears. These fears persist, for the most part, in contemporary mainstream coverage

Asymptotically Truthful Equilibrium Selection in Large Congestion Games

Studying games in the complete information model makes them analytically tractable. However, large $n$ player interactions are more realistically modeled as games of incomplete information, where players may know little to nothing about the types of other players. Unfortunately, games in incomplete information settings lose many of the nice properties of complete information games: the quality of equilibria can become worse, the equilibria lose their ex-post properties, and coordinating on an equilibrium becomes even more difficult. Because of these problems, we would like to study games of incomplete information, but still implement equilibria of the complete information game induced by the (unknown) realized player types. This problem was recently studied by Kearns et al. and solved in large games by means of introducing a weak mediator: their mediator took as input reported types of players, and output suggested actions which formed a correlated equilibrium of the underlying game. Players had the option to play independently of the mediator, or ignore its suggestions, but crucially, if they decided to opt-in to the mediator, they did not have the power to lie about their type. In this paper, we rectify this deficiency in the setting of large congestion games. We give, in a sense, the weakest possible mediator: it cannot enforce participation, verify types, or enforce its suggestions. Moreover, our mediator implements a Nash equilibrium of the complete information game. We show that it is an (asymptotic) ex-post equilibrium of the incomplete information game for all players to use the mediator honestly, and that when they do so, they end up playing an approximate Nash equilibrium of the induced complete information game. In particular, truthful use of the mediator is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in any Bayesian game for any prior.Comment: The conference version of this paper appeared in EC 2014. This manuscript has been merged and subsumed by the preprint "Robust Mediators in Large Games": http://arxiv.org/abs/1512.0269

Eliciting Behavior From Interactive Narratives: Isolating the Role of Agency in Connecting With and Modeling Characters

A key component differentiating interactive storytelling from non-interactive media is agency, or control over character choices. A series of experiments show that providing agency over a character increased the user-character connection, which then increased engagement in a character-consistent charitable act. Findings were observed in technologically simple online narratives that controlled for navigation/controller differences, graphics, sounds, lengthy play, and avatar customization. Effects emerged even though users did not practice these acts by making their character behave charitably. Findings were robust across happy and unfortunate endings and across first-, second-, and third-person narrative perspectives. Findings suggest promise for developing inexpensive ‘‘storygames’’ to encourage supportive behaviors